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8 Meeting expectations 
On the challenges of collaborative 
research through European funding 
Eric Mangez and Pieter Vanden Broeck 
The development of large international research projects that gather diverse 
academics and researchers over a significant period of time is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Precisely what is new is not the fact of collaboration as such: it 
is rather the fact that collaboration is increasingly being incentivized (funded) and 
governed (controlled), through policy programmes, funding agencies and so 
on (Papatsiba 2013). This evolution has resulted in a double outcome. While the 
governing of research becomes apparent through the emergence of stringent 
policy-related expectations attached to such projects, the financial incentives have 
triggered the rise of new forms of organizations: large, international, temporary 
m;ganizationsor networks that collaboratively conduct research on precise themes 
deemed policy-relevant. 
In the literature, one finds several attempts to establish whether such 
collaborative research is more or less productive than solo research. Mauthner 
and Doucet argue that the social science community has been rather 'unreflexive 
and uncritical in its adoption of team-based research models and practices'. 
According to them there is 'an unspoken assumption that team research is 
"better" than solo research' (Mauthner and Doucet 2008: 972). Our argument 
in this chapter is that the question one should ask is not whether such or such 
a form of research organization is more or less productive, better or worse, than 
another. One should rather wonder how a given form of research organization 
works and responds to its external conditions of possibility. That is, how scientific 
research handles the expectations raised by its political environment through 
policy-makers and the like. We are thus particularly interested in the inside and 
the outside of large EU-fonded research projects, which implies understanding 
the interaction between their internal functioning and the external (policy) 
demands they are supposed to respond to. Let us begin with a brief outline of the 
changing environment of research in social science. 
External expectations: the European context 
of research funding in social sciences 
Knowledge, including research-based knowledge, is increasingly conceived of as 
a key factor in the economy and as a resource for policy. Europe has increasingly 
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been describing itself and its future as knowledge-intensive. The European 
Commission has adopted a knowledge-oriented su·ategy. Renewed expectations 
about the usefulness of social science have been expressed by policy-makers 
at different levels (Brown and Lauder 1997; Solesbury 2001). According to 
the former British Education Secretary, David Blunkett, policy-makers 'need 
to be able to rely on social science and social scientists to tell [them] what works 
and why and what types of policy initiatives are likely to be most effective' 
(Blunkett 2000: 21, quoted in Pons and van Zanten 2007). 
The European Commission has produced specific documentation that 
articulates very clearly what is expected from EU-funded research projects. 
A central assumption running through this documentation is that research 
projects must produce knowledge material that is "useful, accessible and 
meaningful to policy-makers" (European Commission 2008: 7) . One of the main 
concerns of the European Union is to 'maximize the policy-making impact of 
projects' (European Commission 2008: 7). Project coordinators are therefore 
encouraged 'to put the policy-usefulness of their research findings to the forefront 
of their objectives and their work programmes'; 'the subject chosen as well as the 
scope of the research [must] respond to defined policy-making priority areas'. 
Their view is clear: research-based knowledge needs to be produced for policy-
makers and for policy purposes. They also speak of the need to bridge the 'gap 
between science and policy' (European Commission 2008: 7). 
Several recommendations listed by the European Commission insist on the 
fact that researchers should learn to 'translate' their work so that it becomes 
understandable for policy-makers. Researchers should learn, it is argued, how to 
write short briefings or 'policy briefS'. It is suggested that they should be 
encouraged 'to present their project results to teachers and smdents in schools in 
order to ensure that these are readily understandable by a non-specialist audience' 
(European Commission 2008: 17). 
As has been made clear, when funding a project, the Commission's expectation 
is not simply that the project will contribute to the construction of the European 
Research Area; it is also expected that its results can be 'used' so as to have 
an 'impact'. Member states and the EU institutions, it is argued, 'need to use 
evidence-based policy and practice to identify which reforms and practices are the 
most effective, and to implement them most successfully' (European Commission 
2007: 3). The view underlying such expectations is that research projects should 
generate unequivocal, accessible and usable findings that will show what works 
best (Biesta 2007). 
Collaborative research within funded projects: 
internal mechanisms and processes 
Research projects are not all faced with the same expectations. Different types of 
funding generate different types of opportunities and constraints. EU-funded 
research projects occupy a specific position within the sub-field of academic 
research. They gather academics, which makes them attentive to the scientific 
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rules of the game, and, at the same time, they are funded by - and accountable 
to - the Commission, which subjects them to the Commission's particular 
requirements and expectations. Hence, in Luhmann's terms, two kinds of 
communication are involved (each of which occurs in a distinct system): one that 
requires communicating with the scientific community and one that requires 
communicating with the Commission (and the political community). 
Our concern in the following pages is to contrast the internal functioning of 
such projects with the external requirements they are expected to meet. Our 
argument is that such projects experience a series of tensions between distinct 
obligations that lead them to live distinct parallel lives: within the timeframe of 
the project, they must learn to collaborate and they need to learn to manage the 
ways they appear to their political environment (represented by the EU officials), 
so as to respond to the often contradictory demands both systems pose. 
By turning a contemporary transnational EU-funded research project into an 
object of analysis, we develop an empirical exploration of these tensions as they 
emerge through several strategic processes that characterize such projects: the 
making of consortiums, partner involvement, the organization of research work, 
internal communication and the research output of the collaboration. Of course, 
as it is based on a single case study, our examination of these tensions remains 
exploratory. It is meant to raise new questions for further discussions. 
The malting of consortiums: reputation and trust 
The EU funds ' European' research projects. which increasingly require the 
formation oflarge transnational consortiums that gather academics and research-
ers from different countries across Europe. Different types of (contradictory) 
external and internal constraints shape the fabrication of consortiums: reputation 
and trust play a key role. Reputation is used by the Commission as a means for 
selecting projects. When evaluating the quality of submitted research proposals, 
the Commission looks at the composition of their consortiums: who is in the 
consortium thus matters; it affects the chances of success of the submission. Of 
course, reputation is not the main or only criterion but it matters (a fact that has 
been criticized by some scholars for the Matthew effect it generates (Papatsiba 
2013: 445) ). One should note that it is also expected that consortiums include 
Eastern partners and possibly candidate member states as well. 
In contrast with these external constraints, for internal purposes it is important 
for the leaders of any given project to gather people whom they think/ trust 
can work together and share common interests and competencies. Trust 
and personal links are often used by project leaders as a means for selecting 
their partners. Hence consortiums tend both to gather 'well-known people' 
(for externally oriented purposes - reputation) and 'people we know can work 
together' (for internal purposes - trust). 
In Luhmann's vocabulary, the distinction between reputation and trust 
primarily refers to two uncertainties (and thus risks) involved in composing 
a consortium. For fonding entities like the.European Commission, the main risk 
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in distinct segments of the literature and in different languages, experiencing 
sometimes quite distinct working conditions and organizational settings at home 
(some of them were bureaucratic and hierarchical, some were little connected to 
international research activities, while others were much more networked and 
dominant). In addition, researchers involved in the project also differed in tlle 
way they conceived of research and interacted witl1 policy-makers and otl1er actors 
in their various contexts. More generally it can be argued that our project brought 
together a diversity of knowledge cultures. 
Involving participants 
Projects are temporary organizations: tlley are meant to end at a point in time 
(and this, of course, is known in advance by all participants). Hence projects can-
not ignore the fact that they must function in an environment made of more 
permanent systems and structures. One must thus always keep in mind that 
individual project participants take part botl1 in the project as a (temporary) 
organization, possibly in other projects, and in the more permanent structures 
of their home institution (their university, tlleir faculty, their colleagues at 
home, tlleir students). These more permanent - institutional - structures usually 
matter a great deal to individuals. They existed prior to and will remain afi:er the 
termination of the project, and, more often than not, institutional structures play 
a key role in the future of each participant. These two systems (the temporary 
organization of the project and the more permanent home institution) do not 
necessarily generate converging constraints and motives. People 'may see projects 
as ways of making career-moves, of escaping their usual work-setting or improv-
ing their job satisfaction' (Packendorff 1995: 326). In some contexts projects 
may be used by academics so as to modify power relations at home; others use 
projects to 'buy themselves out of teaching' and hence pursue their own research 
agenda; and, more generally, they can be used for pre-existing purposes tllat 
do not always match the project's goals. From the point of view of the 
project management, these multiple home-related elements always remain 
largely invisible and/or appear out of reach. They operate as external, more or 
less hidden, constraints that may orient individual choices and preferences in 
the project. 
Structuring the project, dividing the work 
The KNOW&POL project was interested in 'the role of knowledge in the 
construction and regulation of health and education policy in Europe'. The 
general theme of tlle research project was the knowledge- policy relationship. 
Twelve research teams specializing in the analysis of sector-based policies 
addressed these issues directly in respect of two fields, education and healtl1. The 
project was both multinational and multilevel, in that it was designed to look at 
knowledge and governance problems across eight different countries and in local, 
national and international domains. As a European project bringing together 
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a diversity of traditions, we soon came to see the stakes and issues faced by the 
consortium regarding its ' internal knowledge work' and its relationships with the 
policy community as quasi-identical to the very problems we were studying, 
resulting in the already mentioned 'su·ange loop' between the nvo. 
The project involved a large number of participants. Each of the twelve teams 
included from four to six participants. At any given point in time the project thus 
involved about sixty or seventy participants. Owing to turnover in research 
over a five-year period of time, the project involved over 100 participants. The 
issues at stake in such large projects cannot be compared with problems of 
collaboration in smaller and more stable teams such as those described by several 
anthropologists (Kennedy 1995 ). As we will argue below, the size of the project 
is a key issue, as it has considerable consequences on the social and epistemological 
dimensions of the enterprise. 
Participants were divided into counu·y-based teams. Each team could thus 
be identified as dealing with both a specific sector (education or health) and a 
national context (Belgium, France, Portugal, Scotland, Hungary, Romania, 
Germany, Norway). In Line with EU expectations, the project was drawn up on 
the basis of a pre-established work breakdown structure (WBS). The WBS is 
meant to divide the work into different activities (or work packages) t11at have to 
be performed in a certain order. The KNOW&POL project was divided into 
tlu·ee main orientations, each of which was in turn divided into sub-projects and 
work packages. The project was organized such that all teams would pursue the 
same research tasks in, or from the point of view of, their respective context. 
During Orientation 1, for example, all teams were due to map the knowledge 
available to policy-makers and the links between policy-makers and knowledge 
producers in tl1eir sector and national context; during Orientation 2, all teams 
were to develop case studies related to specific policies relevant in their context 
and sector, paying special attention to the way information and understanding 
are deployed and learning takes place at different stages; during Orientation 3 all 
teams were to study the consu·uction and reception of international instruments 
(PISA in tl1e education sector and several specific WHO reports in the healtl1 
sector), which entailed the production and dissemination of information, sn1dying 
their conception, reception and reappropriation by the decision-makers for whom 
they are intended. The key principle that we want to emphasize here is that all 
teams were to perform the same tasks in tl1eir specific context: they would work 
in parallel and meet and communicate regularly. Communication within the 
project was quite intense and occurred tlu·ough international meetings (twice a 
year), daily email communication and the inter-team circulation of researchers 
(young researchers were offered the opportunity to visit other teams and work 
with t11em at several points in time). 
Project meetings and internal communication 
What is being communicated (information) and how it is being communicated 
and responded to (understanding) depend on how individuals perceive the 
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environment in which communication takes place. International research projects 
provide researchers with specific environments. Hence they may have a sense of 
how they are expected to act and commLtnicate in such contexts. They may use 
culturally available 'frames' to determine what they think is expected of them or 
tend to 'engage in impression management in order to convey a certain image 
to others' (Fuhse 2009: 61 ). 
Expectations guide possibilities of communications, which in tmn confirm or 
modify initial expectations. Roles, in turn, 'are bundles of expectations directed 
to incumbents of positions, or even to specific individuals' (Fuhse 2009: 61-2). 
But in situations that bring together a large diversity of people, even if they are 
all academics and researchers, the participants may not all conceive their role as 
such in the same way; they do not necessarily all share the same expectations. 
Expectations are tested and modified according to actual interactions. In situa-
tions where roles and expectations are heterogeneous, uncertainty about 
what one should do may increase significantly. This, in turn, may incline people 
to retrench into formal, 'safe' behaviours. International research projects have 
indeed often been described as rather formal, organized, conventionalized 
settings (Ozga 2013). 
Several meetings organized by the KNOW&POL project could indeed be 
described as ratl1er formal and choreographed, as has been emphasized by Ozga 
(2013) (altl10ugh less formal discussions in smaller groups and subgroups could 
also take place) . Obviously discussions in large groups are complicated. People 
must take turns. If one wants to react to what has just been said, one may have to 
wait a while before one is given a possibility to speak. By then the course of the 
discussion may have taken a different direction. This, of course , is problematic 
because a conversation is a temporalized process. Any action is based on the pre-
vious action and forms tlle background of former possibilities. Who speaks first, 
whose voice is being heard or kept silent, makes a difference for furtller develop-
ments. What has been said cannot be erased. A conversation is a temporalized 
system that has a life of its own. An important element tllat played a role in the 
meetings and more generally in internal discussions and communication is 
language. Participants in the project came from various linguistic backgrounds. 
Most participants (including Hungarians, Portuguese, Belgian and French) 
would have felt more comfortable in French, but English ended up as the only 
common denominator. This orientation impacts communications among partici-
pants: tllose less comfortable with tl1e English language were naturally less likely 
to make a difference in the discussions. 
The group of participants in the KNOW&POL project was not simply a group 
of individuals. There were teams involved. Most teams were made of individuals 
who had known each otl1er - and had often been working together - for a 
significant period of time before tl1e project. While considering tlle individual 
participants is necessary in order to have a sense of the organizational and practi-
cal parameters involved in tlle progress of om (large) meetings, looking at the 
project as an association of teams seems more relevant for understanding the 
intellectual dynamic of tlle project. As teams existed prior to tlle project, to 

diverse, multi -vocal 
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knowledge as a process 
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Observing reality: social and epistemological issues 
in collaborative research 
So far we have tried to establish the difficulties involved in large-scale research 
projects by pointing towards the internal processes and mechanisms that make 
a project what it is. A simple glance at the comparisons instantly reveals how this 
internal functioning of scientific collaboration is orthogonally opposed to the 
expectations of the outside world. Adhering to these external expectations 
is therefore not a simple task, sometimes simply impossible, and often implies 
a continuous effort from the research teams involved. 
Having a large number of people working together investigating the same 
research problem may appear at first as a numerical advantage: there are 'more 
hands and more minds' in such large enterprises (Papatsiba 2013 : 443) than in 
solo research projects; the work can be divided; things, it is assumed, may go 
faster; more workload can be undertaken and achieved. All such assumptions, 
which emphasize the supposed advantages of collaboration, fail to take account 
of the fact that collaborative research projects must handle an additional problem: 
that of collaboration itself. One could see this problem simply in terms of costs 
(time, energy, money) - the collaboration costs - that one must pay in order to 
solve the problem (Katz and Martin 1997). But this again would be misleading, 
as it underestimates the complex of social and epistemological stakes and risks that 
are involved in funded collaborative work. It fails to allow for the fact that this 
type of situation changes the social and epistemological conditions of research . 
Collaborative research should not be considered as the same as solo research, 
with only the numerical difference of the workforce, or only the (quantifiable) 
difference of the costs of collaboration: 'what we know about how individuals 
conduct research cannot simply be transferred to what groups do' (Wasser and 
Bresler 1996: 8). 
In the following paragraphs we will try to single out two facto rs that might 
explain these difficulties in more detail. One reason points to the social character 
of collaborative research. Every research project is, of course, embedded in a 
social context, be it carried out by a single researcher or a group. In collaborative 
projects, we will indicate, this given can , however, be the source of difficulties. 
The other reason adds an epistemo logical layer to the social character of 
doing research collectively. We will argue that the reality of research changes 
when there are several observers observing the same reality, and point to a strategy 
devised during the KNOW&POL project to cope with this epistemological 
difficulty. 
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Consortiums as fields 
An international project that gathers distinct (in some cases well-known) 
academics inevitably functions as a social field (Hilgers and Mangez 2014) - that 
is, a social space where individuals struggle for their intellectual existence and 
recognition (Bourdieu 1988). It is a space marked by a tension between similarity 
and distinction, between connection and differentiation, as it gathers individuals 
who have something in common - an interest in the field's central matter - and 
who simultaneously need to distinguish (differentiate) themselves from one 
another (Bourdieu 1996). 
The participant's needs for distinction within a scientific field are actualized 
through their position-taking in favour of these or those concepts, methods or 
hypotheses. One of the axioms of the theory of fields is that naming and classifying 
operations always play a partisan role in the unending struggle to impose the social 
order of the field (Bourdieu 1977). The implications of this for the coordination of 
collective research are often neglected: if a field is made of elements that need to 
distinguish themselves from one another, how are they to be coordinated? If a 
consortium is made of distinct parties in need of differentiation, how can a common 
goal be pursued? How is such an association of distinct systems to be coordinated? 
One can imagine two scenarios. The first scenario consists in implementing 
common specifications, methodologies and framework across all teams despite 
the inevitable forces towards distinction present in any social field . It thus requires 
exerting forces that will run against (counterbalance) the inclination towards dif-
ferentiation that govern social fields. One must impose restrictions on reflexivity. 
The second possibility is more organic: instead of all participants trying to develop 
the same research tasks, the idea lies in having them all do what they are most 
inclined to do, within certain limits defined by the project. Governing the project 
then amounts to steering different autonomous systems and subsystems though 
feedbacks. The obvious problem that such a scenario generates is the problem 
of comparison. In practice, the KNOW&POL project slightly moved from the 
first to the second scenario during its life course. The issue, however, is not 
solely social. The plurality of observers involved in a consortium raises an essential 
epistemological difficulty. 
The plurality of observers 
To grasp this difficulty one needs a theory of observation. We will make use of 
the epistemological backbone ofNiklas Luhmann's theory ofsystems.2 According 
to Luhmann, any observation is based on a selection. In order to observe 
reality, at any given point in time, one needs to select, among all possible ways of 
observing, one way of observing. In order to understand a given reality, among 
all possible ways of understanding it, one needs to select (construct) one way 
(and exclude all others). 
Luhmann then distinguishes between first-order and second-order observa-
tions. First-order observations are acts of observing that are not aware of being 
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selective (one could also say 'productive' as a substitute for 'selective', in the sense 
that 'observing reality" amounts to 'producing reality'). First-order observatiorn 
are thus observations that operate under the illusion of observing 'the world as i1 
is'. Second-order observations amount to observing the observers. At the level ol 
second-order observation, which is a form of self-observation, it becomes impos-
sible to work as if observations were observations of ' the world as it is'. At the 
level of second-order observations, it becomes obvious that different people, dif-
ferent actors, different researchers observe the world in different ways. One has 
no access to reality 'as it is'. Reality can only be observed, and any observation is 
a contingent construction of reality. In addition, one cannot forget that, while 
individual systems observe, their observations are produced internally and cannot 
be shared with others without being further observed by others, hence selected 
and transformed once more. One can easily understand that a system such as a 
large research project, which gathers a diversity of people, profiles and disciplines, 
and which is expected to speak unequivocally about the world, is likely to face the 
problem of wondering whether there is actually something out there that all par-
ticipants can actually look at and observe together at once. All collective research 
projects face this problem. It is, however, probably more likely to surface when 
consortiums are made of distinct traditions and disciplines. 
We argue that it is difficult to discipline different observers (different observing 
systems) into becoming one (collective) observer. The problem of the 'plurality 
of observers' (Luhmann 2012: 103) can be avoided if observers make first -
order observations only. Paraphrasing Luhmann, researchers can then work under 
the illusion of having direct contact with reality 'at least as long as they only 
observe what they observe and do not observe how they observe' (Luhmann 
2012: 50). This type of functioning is likely to facilitate collaboration, for it 
keeps those collaborating from questioning their own and each other's ways of 
accessing/constructing reality. This did not correspond to the route taken by 
the KNOW&POL project. In the KNOW&POL project, even a relatively discrete 
object such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
appeared to be different things when observed by different observers. Indeed , 
despite the fact that the project participants had all defined a common framework 
for investigating (observing) PISA, the fact remains that they 'saw' the instrument 
in different ways. Some saw it as a ' platform to make durable connections with 
and between the worlds of politics and knowledge, by taking into account the 
differences between these and by creating products able to feed their different 
interests and dispositions ... ' (Carvalho 2014: 68). Others argued that PISA 
played the role of third-party evaluator, transforming the relationship between 
state and civil society by putting the elites under the watchful eye of civil society 
(Mangez and Cattonar 2009, 2010), while also decreasing the autonomy of 
science (Mangez and Hilgers 2012); others considered PISA as a technology 
that increases both international visibility and interdependence ( Grek 2012 ), 
and so on.3 These distinct views were not opposed to one another or contra-
dictory. They were observations made by distinct observers, relying on different 
distinctions. 
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Various observations by various observers can be coordinated at the level of 
second-order observations. This is because each observation uses a distinction 
that draws as it were a line between what it can and cannot see. Second-order 
observations render visible what has been excluded in the first order. They 
make apparent the contingency of each act of observation, excluding their 
own, and open up the selectivity of observation for discussion. Observations 
become choices and choices become attributable to observers, which in their 
turn become accountable for their selectivity. 
The notion of 'comparison zones', which we developed during the 
K.NOW&POL project, is illustrative of our efforts to construct a discursive space 
where multiple viewpoints can be expressed and gathered, so as to be reflected 
upon (and in a way ' looked at'): a space where second-order observation can take 
place. The notion of the 'zone' was meant as an open space, a white page, an area 
or arena of reflection. A dozen such zones were created, each conceived as 
a prompt to explore a given question, and each prompt was an invitation rather 
than a prescription, explicitly including the possibility of questioning the ques-
tion, interrogating the interrogation, reflecting on its relevance for each particular 
case (Freeman and Mangez 2013). It was meant as a place where we could test 
whether we were (all) looking at the same object without a priori assuming that 
it was, could be or needed to be the case. It was a place where first-order observa-
tions could be gathered and (become) observed: a place for the observation of 
our observations. The reason why we felt we needed such place is because we 
had - more or less consciously - come to the conclusion that it was simply not 
possible to assume that we could (all ) observe (the same) reality. Our obser-
vations were - and all observations are - selective and selectively constructed by 
the means of observation (distinctions) being used, which inevitably include 
one's intellectual traditions and research experiences as well as one's theoretical 
(implicit and explicit) background. The internal diversity of the consortium 
made this palpable. Hence we could not all observe the same 'thing'; we could 
not all use the same distinctions; we could not all make strictly comparable 
(first-order) observations. Comparison becomes possible only at the level of 
second-order observation where ways of observing are made visible. The 
object of investigation can then no longer be the world as such, but only ways 
of observing the world. 
Speaking truth to power? 
Collaborative research is only one of the several forms in which the contemporary 
relationship between science and policy becomes apparent. Like other forms 
(think tanks, government-led study centres, advisory boards, ad hoc expertise and 
so on), it rests, however, on the same, more general expectation that the best 
criteria for sound political decision-making are those distilled from scientific 
knowledge . This expectation conforms strongly to the self-descriptions of the 
political world, as emphasized in the first section of this chapter, but often much 
less so to the sociological reality of its decision-making process. What sociological 
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reality then illustrates is that scientific expertise often merely functions as a 'brain 
bank' (Boffey 1975) whose authority can be borrowed politically in order to 
ensure the legitimacy of decisions. 
What is more of interest here, though, is the very specific assumption hidden 
in this expectation - namely, that scientific knowledge can be transferred into poli-
tics. Considered from the viewpoint of Luhmannian systems theory, especially 
since its autopoietical turn, the idea of a simple transfer of knowledge from one 
system to another is, however, a plain impossibility.• When reflecting on our 
observations during the KNOW&POL project, it appeared that none of the 
case studies we had conducted would actually provide evidence of processes of 
transfer of knowledge from research to politics. The two systems operate follow-
ing strictly different logics. For science, the difference between power and lack 
thereof simply does not constitute a 'difference that makes a difference' (Bateson 
1972: 315 ): it holds no informative value whatsoever to judge tl1e truthfulness 
of a scientific statement. The binding character of political decisions is dependent 
not on the truth of what has been decided, but only on the power that corre-
sponds to the position of the decision-maker. What the operative closure of 
functions systems like science and politics then really means is that those systems 
realize themselves through a very specific logic and meaning-making process by 
a selective linking of their own elements. Precisely tl1is modus operandi excludes 
the possibility of exchanging knowledge between tl1em. 
This does not imply that policy-aimed research or the quest for scientific 
expertise are hopeless endeavours; at least, not in the sense that the operative 
closure of science and politics inevitably paralyses the functioning of botl1. 
It certainly may cause frustrations and a general sense of unhappiness on 
both sides (Luhmann 2013c: 114). But the operativity of both systems is not 
affected: both systems can continue doing what they do, despite tl1e lack of 
communicability between them. Frustration with tl1e results of funded research, 
for example, will typically lead to the articulation of more stringent expectations 
or even the reform of funding programmes: that is, to even more political deci-
sions. Conversely, the difficulty that scientists experience in their relationship 
with policy-makers can be turned into an object of research (as in the current 
chapter). In this sense, the lack of communicative possibilities between the two 
systems is indeed irritating, but these irritations are put to work within each 
system respectively. They stimulate furtl1er operativity and do not bring the 
system to a halt. For both science and the political system, the expectation 
of knowledge-based policy offers a point of orientation that allows both to continue 
operating. The real question here, therefore, is how botl1 can operate smoothly, 
simultaneously and next to each other, knowing that there is no chance for 
communication between them. 
Luhmann's theory of systems offers the notion of 'performance' as a first 
answer to this question . Luhmann understands performances as a specific form of 
reference. Generally speaking, fonction systems (like politics or science) can estab-
lish three distinct forms of reference (Luhmann 1997: 757). When the operation 
of a function system (say decisions, in the case of politics) refers to society as a 
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whole and thus to the system of which it is a differentiated part, it realizes its 
function. That is: it refors to the problem by which it differentiates itself from 
other societal realms. Politics then distinguishes itself from science, art or law by 
its ability to guarantee collectively binding decisions. When a function system 
refers to its own operations, a form of self-reference is established that Luhmann 
calls reflection. One can think of political decisions that explicitly thematize 
earlier political decisions, in this case. Lastly, a function system can refer to another 
function system in its environment. When that is the case, it realizes a performance 
for that function system. Policy-makers asking for scientific advice are asking for 
a performance, in Luhmannian terms. It is important to note tlut the selection 
of one type of reference does not exclude the system from realizing its fi.mction . 
Even when reflecting on its earlier decisions, politics cannot evade the necessity 
of offering a binding decision on the matter. 
From the perspective of the performing system, performing involves managing 
the ways one is seen by others, thus making oneself observable and acceptable 
from tl1e viewpoint of another functional system. Performances5 rely on a very 
specific self-stylization of commw1ication. For communication to succeed as 
a performance, it has to disguise itself as it were - thus tying in with the more 
common understanding of the word as an 'act', a ' show'. First, it has to under-
stand its difference from its environment as a double bOLmdary for input and 
output. Scientific policy advice understands itself not only as science, and as 
such, different from the actual decision-making. It simultaneously employs tl1is 
difference to claim its output as a valuable input source for the decision process. 
The difference between science and policy thus appears as a zone of boLmdary-
crossing or transfers, with clearly distinct and asymmetrical roles for each of the 
systems: one performs (output), tl1e other accepts (input) . Remarkably, perform-
ances not only use, but simultaneously try to break, their closed character by 
presenting their communications as actions, able to reach outside their own sys-
tem boundaries. In this sense, performant communication operates under the 
illusion of environmental contact: although it cannot escape its own autopoiesis 
and cannot operate outside its own boundaries, it presents itself as if it could. 
In tl1e same sense, the idea of scientific advice designates more than merely the 
scientific character of what is advised . It includes the conviction of the ability to 
advice in tl1e political decision-making. 
In order for the performance to succeed and this self-presentation 
effectively to convince, both systems, the performing and the observing system, 
need to respect certain conditions. Put into Luhmann's vocabulary: they need 
to respect - or even reflect, as it were - each other's code and programming. Ir 
our case tlus means that policy-oriented science may need to incorporate view· 
points and consider goals tl1at are not per se usual in scientific praxis. It also mean: 
that science needs to practise a certain sensitivity to the expectations put forwarc 
by policy-makers, such as those included in the first paragraphs of this chapter 
however difficult or even impossible that may be. Conversely, it implies that poli 
tics needs to organize its own decision-making (through the creation of specifo 
positions, like expert commissions, for example), so that scientific performance 
Meeting expectations 125 
can be aligned with political goals. What appears then as transfer of knowledge is 
from this viewpoint ultimately a mutual fine-tuning of observational perspectives 
and its impact on the level of political and scientific programming. The result is 
then not a transfer of knowledge based on interaction, but an adaptation, through 
mutual observation, of both systems, to the sensitivities and requirements of the 
other system. In that sense, both politics and science actively use their own closed 
character to develop new observational perspectives in order to pursue their 
own operativity. 
Knowledge-based governing forms 
Throughout this chapter, we have uied to explore the impossible relationship of 
science and politics by means of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. We 
have first explained the difficulties in projects confronting external expectations 
with their inner dynamics. We have tried to offer some perspective on why 
these difficulties arise. We have also attempted to model the relationship theo-
retically in order to underline the many limitations involved in speaking truth 
to power. In this last section, we would like to look at the political system once 
more. The development of performances is not the only solution to the prob-
lem of (in)communicability between science and politics. Another possibility 
is for the political system to develop new ways of handling its (increasingly 
knowledge-intensive) environment. 
The project of a knowledge-intensive Europe has increased the complexity of 
the political environment. The urge to develop knowledge-based policy-making 
has made policy-makers all the more sensitive to knowledge claims in their envi-
ronment. But we know from systems theory that a system can never include or 
comprehend its environment: the knowledge-intensive political environment can-
not enter (or be communicated into, or understood by) the political system: as 
an environment, it can only irritate (or else remain ignored by) the system 
(Luhmann 2013d: 121- 5). Hence, the more knowledge that is produced in the 
environment of policy-makers, the greater the risk that irritation will increase 
at the boundaries of the political system. The idea that more knowledge will 
mechanically lead to better decision-making must therefore be opposed. More 
knowledge means more doubts, more possibilities and more questions. While 
doubts can be handled in the scientific system (one could even say that doubts are 
necessary for the science system to continue its autopoesis ), they risk creating 
(environmental) initations (frustrations) for the political system. 
The risks related to increased irritation (from the environment) are those of 
increased complexity (in the system). Such risks may be reduced or dealt with 
through various means. One possibility lies in crafting new internal arrangements 
within the political system. The creation of specific units dedicated to observing 
scientific developments6 and the formulation of explicit expectations like those 
that we have described in the first section of the chapter can be considered exam· 
pies of specific arrangements by means of which the political system attempts to 
deal with its environment. Another possibility for the political system is to narrow 
126 Eric Mangez and Pieter Vanden Broeck 
down its interests in its (knowledge -intensive ) environment (and, correlatively, 
increase its indifference (exclusion) towards it). The political system may thus 
select in its (irritating) knowledge-intensive environment specific knowledge 
forms that will enter the system and support the governing process . The key issue 
then is selecting (one must remember that a selection is a form of production) 
knowledge forms suitable to function as meaningful communications in the pol -
icy system. Of course, selecting ( including) specific knowledge forms also means 
rejecting (excluding) others. One must then ask what sort of knowledge forms 
can become selected so as to function as governing forms. 
Our argument here is that depending on the type of communication (that 
is, the mode of governing) that prevails in the political system, the system will 
select distinct events (information, knowledge, and so on) from its environment.7 
The KNOW&POL project has distinguished bureaucratic governing from post-
bureaucratic governance. Bureaucratic governing is typically about introducing 
a new rule - that is, an input that is expected to generate a specific output 
(compliance with the rule). Post-bureaucratic policy is more subtle. It can, for 
example, be about introducing a new type of information (or knowledge) into 
the system in the hope of generating further differences through learning. 
Evaluation policy is an example of post-bureaucratic governance: by providing 
teachers with feedback on how well they perform (Simons 2014), it is expected 
that they will (autopoietically) reflect on the feedback and learn how to do 
what they do better, which will improve their performance, which will in turn be 
reflected in the next evaluation and will show in further feedbacks, which will 
encourage them to amplify their efforts further, and so on. No simple direct 
input-output schema is involved. It is rather expected, as in a loop, that those 
being governed will process the information autonomously and adjust their 
practice as a function of this process (Carvalho 2011 ). Post-bureaucratic modes 
of governance consist in attempting to turn the actors' autonomy and reflexivity 
into a means for governing. We suggest using the notion of ' knowledge-based 
governing form' to designate policy insuuments that work through the dif-
fusion of knowledge. Of course, not any kind of knowledge can become a 
governing instrument of this sort. The knowledge tl1at plays a governing role 
is of a special kind. It is often a simplified version of more complex statements 
and more complex data; it is normative and presented as factual; it is often 
comparative (using standardized indicators and numbers) and/ or made up of 
best practices. These are knowledge forms that can play a (post-bureaucratic) role 
in tl1e political system. 
Notes 
As scientists cannot read all publications and judge all works on the basis of thei r 
scientific value (truthfulness), they too use reputation as a secondary means of reducing 
complexity within the science system. 
2 More precisely, we will rely on his appropriation of what is generally known as second-
order cybernetics. This theoretical orientation stretches back to Heinz von Foerster's 
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of governance consist in attempting to turn the actors' autonomy and reflexivity 
into a means for governing. We suggest using the notion of ' knowledge-based 
governing form' to designate policy insuuments that work through the dif-
fusion of knowledge. Of course, not any kind of knowledge can become a 
governing instrument of this sort. The knowledge tl1at plays a governing role 
is of a special kind. It is often a simplified version of more complex statements 
and more complex data; it is normative and presented as factual; it is often 
comparative (using standardized indicators and numbers) and/ or made up of 
best practices. These are knowledge forms that can play a (post-bureaucratic) role 
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Notes 
As scientists cannot read all publications and judge all works on the basis of thei r 
scientific value (truthfulness), they too use reputation as a secondary means of reducing 
complexity within the science system. 
2 More precisely, we will rely on his appropriation of what is generally known as second-
order cybernetics. This theoretical orientation stretches back to Heinz von Foerster's 
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distinction ( 1981) between first- and second-order observations and tries to formulate 
a theory of the observation of observations. In Luhmann 's observation theory this 
difference is reworked by coupling it to some basic intuitions from the formal logic of 
George Spencer Brown ( 1969). Within this logic, as we will briefly explain, observing 
becomes synonymous with the indicative use of two-sided distinctions. Still in line with 
Spencer Brown's calculus of forms, Luhmann simultaneously adds an operational 
character to the act of observation by combining the very notion of observation with his 
general theory of social systems. At least, since Luhmann's 'autopoietic turn', system 
formation coincides with operations and operations imply observations. In that sense, it 
is useful to remark that we are certainly dealing with a constructivist theory - but one 
that refuses a naive radical constructivism in favour of a more operative 
constructivism that not only distinguishes between object and observers, but opens up 
the complexity of their relationship, by adding both the observation and the observation 
of observations to the equation (cf. Esposito 1996). 
An excellent and accessible introduction to Luhman n's theory of systems can be found 
in the posthumously published Introduction to Systems Theory (2013d). Social Systems 
( 1995) and the two-part Themy of Society (2012, 2013c) offer a more robust overview, 
while still accessible to non-German readers. Other works in English are thematically 
driven and include: Political Theory in the Welfan State ( 1990b), Risk: A Sociological 
Theory (1993 ), An as a Social System (2000a), Problems of Reflection in the System of 
Education (with K.-E. Schorr, 2000), The Reality of the Mass Media (2000b), Law as 
a Social System (2004), LoJIC: A Sltetch (2010), A Sociological Theory of LaJP (2013a) and 
A Systems Theory of Religion (2013b). 
3 These different views were geared to the level of second-order observations through the 
publication of special issues. In the case of PISA, a special issue was published in the 
Etwopean Ed1icational R esearch Journal (Carvalho 2012; Grek 2012; Mangez and 
Hilgers 2012; Neumann et al. 2012; Ozga 2012; Pons 2012). 
4 Function systems, like politics or science, lack valid addressees, and any possibility of 
interaction between each other is therefore excluded (cf. Luhmann 1997: 834) . Who 
could claim the authority to speak for all of science - o r even merely social science? 
Unlike organizations, whose hierarchical structure based on decision power allows for 
'spokespersons' to represent their unity, ti.mction systems lack the ability to communicate 
in unison with their environment. Furthermore, the operative closure of systems can 
hardly be reconciled with the exchange of elements, processes or structures. 
5 Performance (Leistung, in German), as understood by systems theory, refers to the 
operativity of two heterarchically positioned systems, whereby the operations of 
one system are considered an event that strengthens the selectivity of the other's 
operativity (cf. Fuchs 1992: 101-2). It allows one to distinguish between what a certain 
event (the publication of scientific advice, for example) produces in term of consequences 
for the selectivity of the performing system and the other system. For science, this may 
imply increased attention to policy-related issues, for example, relegati ng less 'fundable' 
research topics to the background. For policy, it may simplify the decision process, by 
lessening the importance of other, non-scientific (for example, religious, economic or 
even personal ) decision facto rs. 
6 The European Commission has for example decided to try to promote ' easy access 
to research findings', by means of what it has called 'a one-stop shop for all projects' 
(EC 2008: 21 ). 
7 Governing is always about introducing a difference into a system in the hope that it will 
bring about changes. A difference can be introduced so as to produce effects that 
generate and amplify differences in a certain direction. A difference can also be introduced 
in the hope of reducing an existing difference (as is the case with positive discrimination, 
for example). Policies may also generate unexpected effects in the system (or they may 
generate a chain of effects that neutralize the initial difference). 
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